The Real
Meaning of “Progressive” Politics
By Barry Loberfeld
To the
American mind, the most formal connotation of the term progressive is
the Progressive Movement, a period of reform that ranged from the late 1800s to
the end of World War I. Unlike its predecessor, the Populist Party, Progressivism
was not a movement of farmers or manual laborers. Its guiding lights were
college-educated men who were consequently steeped in the post-Enlightenment
collectivism that had taken hold of the universities both here and in Europe.
Among its apostles were “economists who adopted the ‘organic’ collectivism of
the German historical school, sociologists and historians who interpreted
Darwin according to the social ideas of Hegel (the ‘reform’ Darwinists),
clergymen who interpreted Jesus according to the moral ideas of Kant (the
Social Gospelers), single-taxers who followed Henry George, Utopians who
followed Edward Bellamy ... ‘humanitarians’ who followed Comte ... pragmatists
who followed William James and the early John Dewey.” (Peikoff)
The man who
is now virtually synonymous with Progressivism, Herbert Croly (The Promise
of American Life), was himself both the son of a noted proponent of Comtian
positivism and the student of Harvard's Josiah Royce, a disciple of Hegel. All
of these thinkers contributed to what would become the ethical foundation of
the Progressive Movement: a contempt and loathing of "individualism"
-- and its political expression in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution:
§
Croly:
"The Promise of American Life is to be fulfilled ... by a large measure
of individual subordination and
self-denial."
§
Sociologist
Lester Ward: "The individual has reigned long enough."
§
Antitrust
leader Henry Demarest Lloyd: Individualism is "one of the historic
mistakes of humanity."
§
The
Outlook editor
Lyman Abbott: "[I]ndividualism is the characteristic of
simple barbarism, not
of republican civilization."
§
Baptist
minister Walter Rauschenbusch: "[I]ndividualism means tyranny."
So great was
this fear of the individual that John Dewey believed that the "mere
absorbing of facts and truths is so exclusively individual an affair that it
tends very naturally to pass into selfishness." "Progressive
education" was developed to meet the individualist threat on the juvenile
level, while Progressive collectivization of the economy would meet it on the
adult, with the first targets being those unregulated monoliths of
"economic power" -- the corporations.
Here is
where Progressive myth collides with historical reality. The myth is that these
"trusts" were becoming monopolies that were then able to use their
power to "strangle" the rest of the country -- and all because the
government clung to an out-dated doctrine of laissez faire that prevented even
modest regulation. And the reality? “Despite the large number of mergers, and
the growth in the absolute size of many corporations, the dominant trend in the
American economy ... was toward
growing
competition. Competition was unacceptable to many key business and financial
interests ... As new competitors sprang up, and as economic power was diffused
throughout an expanding nation, it became apparent to many important
businessmen that only the national government could [cartelize] the economy ...
[I] t was not the existence of monopoly that caused the federal government to
intervene in the economy, but the lack of it.” (Kolko)
If Big
Business was the devil of Progressive rhetoric, it was nonetheless the
beneficiary of Progressive policy. How did Progressivism's means lead to such a
corrupt end? How did a movement that advocated greater democracy, that insisted
that the "National Government must step in and discriminate ... on behalf
of equality and the average man" (Croly), bring about the rise of
bureaucracies that were removed from democratic review and "invariably
controlled by leaders of the regulated industry" (Kolko)? Along with the
chasm between the myth and the market, an illuminating answer can be found in
Dewey's own definition of democracy: "that form of social organization, extending
to all areas and ways of living, in which the powers of individuals shall ...
[be] directed" -- by the State, which can justly be described as the god
of Progressive belief.
In addition
to Prohibition and segregation, the Progressives' anti-individualist idealism
found yet another manifestation -- militarism. Under the Roosevelt
Administration, the "spirit of imperialism was an exaltation of duty above
rights, of collective welfare above individual self-interest ... [of] the
heroic values as opposed to materialism, action instead of logic, the natural
impulse rather than the pallid intellect" (Osgood) -- in short, an
exaltation of every tenet of Progressive ideology above Enlightenment
liberalism. This manifestation tumefied with the outbreak of war in Europe,
with the Progressives clamoring for U.S. entry:
§
Journalist
Frederick L. Allen: "War necessitates organization, system, routine, and
discipline. We shall have to give up much of our economic freedom ... We shall
have to lay by our good-natured individualism and march in step."
§
Dewey: The
"social possibilities" of war will supersede the
"individualistic tradition" and demonstrate the "supremacy of
public need over private possessions."
§
Journalist
Ray S. Baker: "We need trouble and stress! I thought once [the abolition
of individualism] could be done by some voluntary revolt from comfort and
property ... But it was not enough. The whirlwind had to come."
§
Croly: The
"tonic of a serious moral adventure" -- i.e., the war -- will prevent
the "real danger of national disintegration" by forcing the American
citizen to elevate "national service" above "having his own
way."
War opponent
Ralph Bourne denounced Dewey and the other Progressives for allying
themselves
with the "least democratic forces in American life." He openly mused
that there
"seems to have been a peculiar congeniality between the war and these
men. It is
as if the war and they had been waiting for each other." It is possible
to suggest
that there was nothing at all "peculiar" about the congeniality
between
the war and
the ideas these men held.
With the end
of World War I came the end of the Progressive Era. What didn't end was the
movement's premise: the substitution of collectivism for individualism, statism
for laissez faire. As a policy, Progressivism continued to progress.
The term progressive
returned to the national scene with the 1948 presidential campaign of former
vice president Henry Wallace and his Progressive Party, whose name pointedly
harkened back to Theodore Roosevelt's own third-party challenge in 1912. But
the raison d'être of this party was a very un-Progressive opposition to any
action by, growth of, or support for the American military. The difference was
that "the enemy" was now Soviet Russia and this Progressive Party was
in fact a creation of the Communist Party and its ranks were filled with
Communists and fellow travelers -- the Old Left -- none of whom had had any
problems with the military when it was fighting Stalin's enemy in Europe. The
Communist domination of the party was recognized by many even then, and Wallace
left it when he supported Truman’s policy in Korea. But not to be lost was the
connection between progressive and a position that reflexively opposed
anything to do with the American military but ideologically supported
collectivization of the American economy beyond what the "liberals"
of the day advocated.
However, the
term did go into hibernation when the Old Left, faltering under the burden of
the Khrushchev revelations, was succeeded by the New Left, which maneuvered to
distance itself from the Old Left's commitments (the USSR), ideology
(Stalinism), and terminology -- including “progressive.” The New Left imagined
itself independent, anti-Stalinist, and "revolutionary."
But by the
end of the 60s, the New Left had realized itself as a movement that proclaimed
“solidarity” with totalitarian regimes from Southeast Asia to Cuba, embraced
Maoism as a visionary creed (especially for the remnants of Students for a
Democratic Society), and had utterly failed to achieve anything
"revolutionary." What next -- a Newer Left? Many activists brought
their leftism with them as they entered mainstream institutions such as the
universities and the Democratic Party. If anything, they were now "liberals"
-- left-liberals, meaning that they were to the left of all other liberals. (Of
course, liberalism itself had shifted markedly leftward, e.g., McGovern.)
And progressive?
The term has today re-emerged to once again denote any person, organization, or
idea left of moderate. It was the centrist liberalism of the Clinton
Administration -- e.g., the (proposed) neo-Progressive cartelization of
medicine, the intervention in the Balkans, the North American Free Trade
Agreement -- that brought forth self-designated "progressives" who
opposed anything less than full socialization of all medicine, the deployment
of U.S. troops anywhere, and the rise of the global economy. The only real
change in the term is how commodious it has become. It encompasses everyone
from an ever-leftward social democrat to a Communist-without-a-Party to such
relatively recent arrivals as the "radical feminist" (i.e., bourgeois
female) fighting the Patriarchal Occupational Government, the Queer activist
fighting "heteronormality," the multiculturalist fighting Western
civilization, and the Deep Ecologist fighting all civilization. It even
includes ideologically exhausted leftists-without-an-ism such as philosopher
Richard Rorty, who allows that the "best we can hope for is more of the same
experimental, hit-or-miss, two-steps-forward-and-one-step-back reforms that
have been taking place in the industrial democracies since the French
Revolution.” What's left is a "progressive" Left that can progress in
any number of directions -- or with none at all.
Which raises
the question of just what progressive really tells us. Something that
means everything, means nothing. Even as a synonym for all things leftist, can
it logically include, for example, the Marxist crucifixion of Malthus and
the Green resurrection of him? Or both pacifism and militarism (the “armed
struggles” of socialist forces)? How can we speak of as “progressive” striving
for a Communist future that is already past – or yearning to drive humanity
“back to the Pleistocene” (an Earth First! slogan)? And exactly how long can a
concept sit on the shelf until you can’t continue to market it as
“progressive”? Presumably, labeling one’s position “progressive” endows it with
the virtue of being forward-looking, relevant, while conversely rendering any
opposing position “reactionary,” backward – all in all, a superficially more
sophisticated alternative to “good” and “evil.” In a public square increasingly
devoid of common referents, forward and back, much like left and right, reveals
neither where a person is coming from nor what he’s going after. For the mere
honesty of the debate, what we need is a political vocabulary whose terms
actually describe the ideas on the table – a proposal evidently more daunting
than its modest tenor would suggest.
Bibliography
E.J. Dionne,
Jr., They Only Look Dead: Why Progressives Will Dominate the Next Political
Era, 1996.
Arthur A.
Ekirch, Jr., Progressivism in America, 1974
Gabriel
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History,
1900-1916, 1963.
Michael
McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement
in America, 1870-1920, 2003.
R.E. Osgood,
Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations, 1953.
Leonard
Peikoff, The Ominous Parallels: The End of Freedom in America, 1982.