In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which was waged to drive Iraq's invading forces out of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council determined that Iraq had not fully complied with the terms of the ceasefire. Consequently, both the UN and the United States (under President Clinton) imposed a number of economic sanctions against Iraq. Moreover, the U.S. and the United Kingdom patrolled Iraqi airspace to enforce "no-fly zones" as a means of protecting the nation's northern Kurds and southern Shiite Muslims from attacks by Saddam Hussein's regime.
From 1991 through October 1997, the UN regularly conducted weapons inspections in Iraq, in an effort to ensure that Saddam's regime was complying with the ceasefire mandate against the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These inspections were of limited value, however, as the Iraqi regime barred inspectors from many so-called "sensitive" sites and vast "presidential palaces." On several occasions between October 1997 and December 1998, Iraq ordered an end to all inspections, only to have them resume after negotiated settlements. Finally, on December 16, 1998 the UN ordered all weapons inspectors out of Iraq after Richard Butler, chief of UNSCOM (acronym for UN Special Commission, which was established to inspect Iraq's suspected chemical and biological weapons capabilities), issued a report stating that the Saddam regime remained uncooperative.
Just hours thereafter, President Clinton ordered air strikes, which continued for four days, against suspected Iraqi weapons sites. Clinton had long expressed grave concern over Iraq's potential WMD capabilities. Back in February 1998, Clinton had said: "What if [Saddam] fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route, which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction. . . . Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you he'll use this arsenal."
The Air Force and intelligence agencies believed the December 1998 bombing campaign had succeeded in degrading a number of Iraqi WMD facilities, but, with no more inspectors on the ground to survey the damages, they never knew for certain. "We might have gotten it all," President Clinton would reminisce in 2003. "We might have gotten half of it; we might have gotten none of it. But we didn't know."
Over the next four years, there were no inspectors in Iraq, meaning that the rest of the world could no longer monitor Saddam Hussein's activities. British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that every nation with an intelligence agency believed unequivocally that Saddam had moved forward with his WMD programs. This certainty, coupled with Saddam's known ties to terrorism, caused the U.S. to fear that the Iraqi dictator would one day use his weapons to strike against American interests. On October 11, 2002, the U.S. Congress passed an Authorization granting President Bush the authority to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein did not unambiguously give up his WMD programs. On November 9, 2002, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441, offering Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been laid out in ten previous resolutions - in particular, to provide "an accurate full, final, and complete disclosure . . . of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles." Under the terms of this Resolution, UN inspectors were to be granted "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to sites of their choosing. Iraq's failure to comply would result in "serious consequences."
As it grew increasingly clear that Iraq was not complying, war seemed imminent. In response, a series of massive anti-war demonstrations were held in many cities across the U.S. and around the world. These rallies were organized by International ANSWER and United For Peace and Justice, two organizations directed by hardline Communists with long histories of condemning American foreign and domestic policies. On February 15, 2003, the largest worldwide anti-war protests in history took place; millions of people participated on every continent, charging that the U.S. was engaged in an immoral and unnecessary "rush to war" solely to satisfy its lust for empire, oil, and mass murder.
On March 17, 2003, President Bush gave Saddam and his family 48 hours to leave Iraq so that all UN weapons-disarmament decrees could be fully enforced. Saddam failed to obey this demand, and on March 19 the U.S.-led coalition launched its invasion. On March 20, coalition troops departed from Kuwait and moved quickly toward Baghdad from the west and southwest; they would cover 186 miles in less than a week. A few days later, U.S. airborne forces in the north opened a third front. By April 4, the U.S.-led coalition had captured Saddam International Airport near Baghdad, and the capital city was largely under coalition control by April 9. By the middle of the month, the Iraqi military had been entirely defeated or dispersed. During this initial invasion period, fewer than 200 allied service personnel, including 138 Americans, died in battle.
Thereafter began the next phase of the war, where terrorist fighters, many of them al Qaeda-affiliated operatives who filtered across Iraq's borders from neighboring nations, launched many hit-and-run attacks, suicide missions, and roadside bombings aimed at both military and civilian personnel. This resistance fueled critics' charges that the Bush administration was conducting the war poorly; that the conflict had turned into a quagmire; that too many lives were being lost for a cause that was unjust and unsupportable. The coalition forces' failure to locate fully developed WMD led many to conclude that Iraq had never even possessed such weapons, and thus had never posed any threat to the United States.
Starting in July 2003, the Democratic National Committee ran a national TV ad whose message was: "Read his lips: President Bush Deceives the American People." This was the beginning of a five-year, unrelenting campaign to persuade Americans and their allies that "Bush lied, people died"; that the war was "unnecessary"; that "Iraq was no threat"; and that the Bush administration had doctored intelligence in order to trick congressional Democrats into supporting the war. In other words, the leaders of the Democratic Party told Americans, America's allies and America's enemies that the U.S. was an aggressor nation which had violated international law and was in effect culpable for the war with the Saddam Hussein regime.
The Democrats' claim that they had been deceived into supporting the war, and that they had turned against it only upon subsequently realizing their mistake, was demonstrably false. Every Democratic Senator who voted for the war had on his or her desk before the vote a 100-page report titled "The National Intelligence Estimate," which summarized all of America's intelligence on Iraq that was used to justify the war. Because America is a democracy; the opposition party has access to all the nation's secrets. Democrats sit on the Senate Intelligence Committee, which oversees all of America's intelligence agencies. If any Democrat on that committee had requested any intelligence information Iraq, he or she would have been supplied with that information within 24 hours. The self-justifying claim that Bush lied to hoodwink the Democrats is a fraudulent charge with no basis in reality.
In this section of DiscoverTheNetworks, the category titled History of U.S.-Iraq Conflict: 1990 to 2003 provides a timeline of the key events in U.S.-Iraq relations during the 13 years that preceded the start of the Iraq War in March 2003.
The category titled Rationale / Justifications for the War examines the political, military, and national-security considerations that played a role in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
The category titled Iraq-Terrorism Connection looks at the ties that existed between Saddam Hussein's pre-war regime and Islamic terror groups.
The category titled WMD: Pre- and Post-War Intelligence examines what the political leaders and intelligence agencies of the United States, and of other countries, knew and/or believed about the state of Iraq's pre-2003 WMD (weapons-of-mass-destruction) programs. It also considers what was subsequently learned about those programs.
The category titled Media Spinning the War examines how the mass media -- whose reporters, editors, and decision-makers are overwhelmingly liberal/left in their politics -- consistently (during the George W. Bush administration) portrayed the events of the Iraq War in a manner that cast American actions, on and off the battlefield, in a negative light. By so doing, the media had a profound influence on the American public's perception of the war, the rationale behind it, and America's chances of winning it.
The category titled Progress in Iraq / Myths Dispelled contains resources that describe the military and political progress that was made in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. This progress was underreported by the media, a stark contrast to the massive coverage devoted to negative news stories from the warfront.
The category titled Rules of Engagement examines how restrictive rules of engagement hindered the efforts of the U.S. military during the early years of the Iraq War.
The category titled Strategies, Goals, and Challenges examines some tactics that have been used and/or proposed as means of ultimately winning the Iraq War. It also features resources that define the major objectives and challenges to which those strategies offered a response.
The category titled Who Is the Insurgency? examines the worldviews and objectives of America's military adversaries in Iraq.
The category titled UN's Pre-War Sanctions against Iraq examines the justification for, the terms of, and the effects of the sanctions that the United Nations enforced against Iraq during the years preceding the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of that country.
The category titled Plamegate centers around Bush administration official I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, who was charged with illegally revealing -- as an act of political retribution -- the identity of CIA employee Valerie Plame Wilson, wife of former U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson.
The category titled Comparisons to Vietnam War examines the claims of those who likened the Iraq War to the Vietnam War, and who characterized both conflicts as unwinnable, ill-conceived quagmires for the United States.
The category titled Calls to Bring Home the Troops examines those voices that called for America to withdraw all troops from Iraq long before the military "surge" of 2007-2008 -- which proved to be extremely effective in decimating the terrorist forces in Iraq -- had been permitted to affect the course of the conflict.
The category titled Iraq Study Group examines the findings and counsel of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, or simply the Baker Commission -- a ten-person (five Democrats and five Republicans) panel appointed on March 15, 2006 by the U.S. Congress. This commission was asked to assess the status of America's military operations in Iraq, and to draft a report containing whatever policy recommendations it deemed useful.
The category titled Iraqi Attitudes about the War explores how Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi public at large have felt about America's 2003 invasion of, and subsequent military presence in, their country.
The category titled Iraqi Elections, Constitution, and New Government explores Iraq's early progress in establishing a new constitutional government in the wake of Saddam Hussein's downfall.
The category titled Negotiating with Terrorist States and Organizations features resources that point out the danger and the folly of negotiating with, and trying to appease, terrorists.
The category titled Withdrawal from Iraq examines the process the by which the United States has carried out its withdrawal of military forces from Iraq.
