Friends in
High Places
In a bid to court Muslim
voters, top White House and political figures once met regularly with a Florida
professor now accused of leading a terror group.
By Michael
Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
Newsweek
Updated:
6:39 p.m. ET May 12, 2005
May 12 - The lawyer for a
Florida-based professor accused of leading a violent Palestinian terror group
will seek to embarrass the U.S. government next month by introducing evidence
that his client attended numerous meetings at the White House and met with
high-level figures in both political parties, including Hillary Clinton and
White House political director Karl Rove, according to recent court records.
Former computer science
professor Sami Al-Arian—a longstanding prime spokesman for Arab-American
political causes—goes on trial next month on charges that he served as a secret
leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The PIJ is a State Department-designated
terrorist organization that U.S. officials charge is responsible for a rash of
suicide bombings and other attacks that led to the deaths of Israeli and
American civilians.
The Justice Department
considers Al-Arian’s case one of the most important terror cases it has brought
under the USA Patriot Act—the post-9/11 law that explicitly authorized the use
of secret national-security wiretaps in criminal cases. But at his trial,
slated to begin in Tampa, Fla., in early June, Al-Arian’s lawyer is
seeking to turn the tables by hammering home his client’s surprising
access to the highest levels of the U.S. government—even at a time that
he was a principal target of a highly sensitive FBI counterterrorism probe.
Just how much access
Al-Arian had is detailed in a letter written to federal prosecutors by his
lawyer, William Moffit, that was recently entered into the court record. Moffit
states that Al-Arian attended meetings at the White House with both Clinton and
Bush every year between 1998 and 2001. In addition, the letter states, Al-Arian
also attended a briefing at the Justice Department in July 2001, met with Al
Gore in November 1998 and Hillary Clinton in October 1999. It also states that
President Bush sent a written apology to Al-Arian’s wife in 2001 when the
couple son’s was denied access to the White House—reportedly because of his
connection to his father.
“Each of these events
occurred at a time that the government is alleging that Dr. Al-Arian was
somehow a dangerous terrorist involved in a conspiracy to kill Americans,”
Moffit wrote in his letter.
“Dr. Al-Arian’s access to
these political figures coupled with the fact there was public-source
information regarding many of the contentions that form the basis of the
government’s indictment seem to belie the notion that Dr. Al-Arian was in
anyway considered by anyone in the intelligence or law enforcement communities
to be any kind of threat to the United States or a threat to harm any officials
of the United States.”
Al-Arian, a former
University of South Florida professor, is charged with conspiring to commit
murder, conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist group, extortion,
visa fraud, perjury and other crimes—all in connection with his alleged service
as a member of the “Shura Council,” the top governing body of Palestinian
Islamic Jihad.
According to the
indictment, which relies heavily on secret wiretaps, Al-Arian regularly
communicated with top PIJ officials in the Mideast, helping to manage their
finances, dispatching funds to the group and relaying messages among its top
leaders. In some of the intercepted conversations, Al-Arian allegedly praised
suicide bombings, kidnappings and drive-by shootings by PIJ. “I call upon
you to try to extend true support to the jihad effort in Palestine so that
operations such as these can continue,” he wrote in one fund-raising appeal
after a suicide bombing that killed 22 Israelis in 1995.
Moffit told NEWSWEEK that
he would not unveil his defense to the charges until opening statements begin
in the trial. But in court papers, he has indicated that he intends to portray
Al-Arian as a freedom fighter and will attempt to put U.S. policy in the Middle
East on trial. He has asked the judge overseeing the case to allow him to
portray members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as “lawful combatants”
who had a legitimate “right to resist” Israeli policies on Palestinian land—a
request that is being strongly resisted by prosecutors.
Moffit also appears to
want to show that U.S. government and political figures, while hardly
sympathetic to those views, were at least willing to tolerate them in their
efforts to win the hearts and minds of Muslims, both internationally and
in the United States. Many of Al-Arian's views about oppression of the
Palestinians, Moffit points out, were expressed openly. To further press the
point about Al-Arian’s high-level access, Moffit asked prosecutors to turn over
any U.S. intelligence or law-enforcement reports relating to Al-Arian’s
meetings as well as photographs of him with top government officials—including
White House political director Karl Rove. Moffit also asked prosecutors to turn
over any secret government recording that might have been made of Al-Arian talking
to a range of top current and former government officials, members of Congress
and political activists. Among them: Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert,
former speaker Newt Gingrich, former deputy secretary of Homeland Security Asa
Hutchinson and Republican political activist Grover Norquist.
A spokesman for the U.S.
Attorney’s office in Tampa, which is prosecuting the Al-Arian case, had no
comment on Moffit’s letter. But some—though not all—of the meetings referred to
in the letter have been publicly referred to in the past. For example, as
NEWSWEEK reported at the time of his indictment two years ago, Al-Arian did in
fact have his photograph taken with President Bush when he was campaigning in
Florida in March 2000 and later was among 150 Muslim-American activists invited
to the White House to attend an “outreach” briefing that was given by Rove.
But what these meetings
mean, and their ultimate significance for Al-Arian’s trial, is far from clear.
Neither Moffit nor prosecutors suggest that political figures did anything
wrong by meeting with Al-Arian. For many Justice Department officials,
the sessions are a prime example of the dysfunctional “wall” that plagued U.S.
counterterrorism efforts prior to the September 11 terror attacks—and was ultimately
eliminated with the Patriot Act.
Although Al-Arian was a
key target of a secret Foreign Intellignence Surveillance Act wiretaps for
years, Justice Department officials interpreted U.S. law to prohibit “sharing”
of such intelligence with criminal investigators—much less political figures in
the White House and Capitol Hill. “The government was just not set up to share
information,” says one Justice official.
But Al-Arian’s access to
Washington figures also illustrates the ardor with which both political parties
ardently courted Muslim and Arab-American votes throughout the 1990s—even
to the point of embracing activists who had already been identified by law
enforcement as problematic figures. For example, another figure who was
associated with Al-Arian—Abdurahman Alamoudi, the former executive director of
the American Muslim Council—had openly proclaimed his support for groups such
as Hamas and Hizbullah at a pro-Palestinian rally in Lafayette Park outside the
White House in October 2000. The State Department considers both to be
terrorist organizations. (“We are all supporters of Hamas. Allahu akbar!”
Alamoudi was quoted as saying.) Yet Alamoudi, who last year pled guilty to
taking undisclosed money from the Libyan government, was warmly welcomed by
many U.S. political and government figures for years—and at one point even
served as a State Department “goodwill” ambassador to the Muslim world. “There
was this whole kumbaya culture,” said Steve Emerson, a veteran researcher who
campaigned for years to expose the alleged terror connections of figures like
Al-Arian and Alamoudi.
Al-Arian’s case
underscores the point because he became, in the view of some observers, a key
figure in George W. Bush’s 2000 campaign efforts to court Muslim and Arab-American
voters—in part by pledging to change U.S. counterterrorism policies. Al-Arian
in particular was pushing for an end to the Justice Department’s use of “secret
evidence” to deport suspected terrorists—a cause that was symbolized by the
case of his brother-in-law, Mazzan Al-Najjar, who was expelled to Lebanon
because of his alleged connections to PIJ. After being briefed about the
Al-Najjar case, Bush even raised the “secret evidence” issue during a debate
with Al Gore in 2000—a move that energized many Muslim activists, including
Al-Arian, who bragged about how he then helped register Muslims in Florida for
the Republican Party. “I think I personally played a big role in electing
Bush,” Al-Arian boasted at a Muslim-American dinner in 2002.
Sources tell NEWSWEEK
that, at first, the White House and Justice Department worked actively to
fulfill Bush’s campaign pledge to restrict the use of “secret evidence.” The
Justice Department prepared a proposal to do so and, after much internal
debate, it was supposed to be personally presented by Bush to a group of Muslim
activists at a White House meeting scheduled to take place at 2 p.m. on the
afternoon of September 11, 2001, according to a source who was slated to attend
the meeting.
Because of the events of
that morning, the meeting was cancelled, and the proposal never saw the light
of day.
© 2005
Newsweek, Inc.
© 2005 MSNBC.com
URL: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7820499/site/newsweek/