by
Matthew Rees
The Middle East Forum
November 22, 2004
Matthew
Rees is the author of Cain's Field: Faith, Fratricide and Fear in the Middle
East (New York: Free Press, 2004) and has been the Jerusalem bureau chief
of Time magazine since 2000. Educated at Oxford University and the
University of Maryland, he served previously as Middle East correspondent for The
Scotsman, Scotland's national newspaper, and as Middle East correspondent
for Newsweek. Mr. Rees addressed the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia
on November 22, 2004.
In Cain's Field, I
examine the disunity within both the Israeli and Palestinian societies, a
disunity that has contributed to the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. In order to describe it, I utilized stories, not of leaders, but of
ordinary people whose sagas may not have been otherwise heard. I aimed to illustrate
how these internal conflicts affect the lives of people not normally covered by
the Western media.
The past approach to diplomacy
has been to try to achieve peace agreements and then deal with internal
divisions. I conclude that this process must be reversed; first deal with the
internal divisions and then bridge the differences between the sides.
Arafat's legacy is a history of
symbolism characterized by constant undermining and undercutting the very
people whom he professed to support. In Cain's Field, I describe the
experience of Zakariya Balush, who served as Arafat's liaison to Arab
intelligence organizations and later as the deputy head of General Intelligence
in Gaza. Balush became disillusioned with Arafat only to receive a call from
him indicating a promotion while consequently implying the insecurity of his
new posting. I also found in my investigations that Arafat injected millions of
dollars into the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, even as he let his own security
forces go without pay for months on end.
Towards the end of his life,
Arafat became a sort of pathetic figure and his physical degeneration can be
seen as a parallel to the overall well being of the Palestinian people. A year
ago, he was diagnosed with stomach cancer but never sought treatment. The
Palestinians also have something eating away at them. Arafat tried to portray
them as victims, a portrayal that was adverse to the wishes of many of them.
After the fighting at Jenin, the international media showed the inhabitants of
the town as victimized. Many of these inhabitants were outraged and would have
preferred being depicted as having stood up to Israeli might. This refusal to
be characterized as a victim reflects upon a different kind of Palestinian
identity that is based upon pride.
The Palestinian elections in
January 2005 mark an important opportunity as they can serve as the basis for
the foundation of a democratic state. Mahmoud Abbas lacks the legitimacy that
Arafat enjoyed; he was a successful fundraiser for the Palestinian cause in the
Gulf states and a good negotiator, but has no power on the ground. The
participation of Hamas in the elections could see it become part of the
democratic process as an alternative to violence and terrorism. There is a hint
that Hamas can channel its energies to other things than terrorism. During an
interview, Abdul Aziz Rantisi discussed with me the concept of the hudna
(ceasefire), explaining that once land has been under Muslim rule it must
always remain Muslim, so it is impossible to cede land to Israel. Muslims must
at least have a rhetorical option to say that one day the land will be
recovered. According to recent polls, Hamas garners 30-40% of popular opinion.
The new leadership will have to
deal with divisions between the internal and external leadership. The external
leadership, brought back along with Arafat from exile in 1994 and given the top
posts, lacks legitimacy on the ground. It is viewed as foreign and degenerate
by many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Their legitimacy rests upon the
Oslo process and little else. The internal leadership consists of those that
were heads of the movements that spurred the first intifada and thus have
popular following but they lack resources.
The international media has huge
faults in its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, it
reports that Arafat was besieged in his compound for three years when he could
leave the compound and did do so in June 2002, when he traveled to Jenin and
Bethlehem. In Jenin he received an angry reception over his failure to protect
the people of the city. Upon arriving at the Church of the Nativity in
Bethlehem, he found that there was no one to greet him and, outraged, he
returned to his compound and did not leave it again until his last trip to
Paris. Arafat realized that he had lost popular support and retreated into his
memories.
Journalists are generally in the
region too briefly to develop a proper sense of what they are covering in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Typically, for the first two years, journalists
write the same stories as their predecessors. The following two years are spent
trying to write new stories while still attempting to get a sense of the two
societies. Most are not in place long enough to develop original insights.
Journalism is too focused on the surface of things.
To bridge the internal divisions
within both Israeli and Palestinian society, each must begin to see the other
as individuals rather than as members of a larger general group. In this way,
problems become personal rather than general and unattached.
The real foundation for getting
past this disunity is democracy. People must feel as if they can find
expression within their own society and that others will listen. Israel has
democracy, but it is not always a society in which people tend to listen to
each other. Palestinian society, on the other hand, does not have anything
approaching democracy at the moment. Democracy will give groups an outlet other
than violence or hate or rejecting other groups. That is why the prospect of
elections is so important now.
This
summary account was written by Samantha Vinograd, a research assistant at the
Middle East Forum.
This item is available on the
Middle East Forum website, at http://www.meforum.org/article/665